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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
GLEN L. NICEWINTER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
DAVID H. NICEWINTER and
. GENEVA C. NICEWINTER,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
7669

MARIE M. DIENER,

Defendant.

APPELLANTS-' .REPLY BRIEF
In view of the fact that respondent's brief contains
a point not considered in appellants' brief, a reply may
prove of possible assistance to the Court. The point,
appearing at page 17 of respondent's brief, reads as follows:

Respondent's Point No. 1

"JUD-GE VAN COTT'S D-ECREE (R. 30, 31) HERE
APPEALED FROM IS AN INTERLOCUTORY
ORDER OR DECISION WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF· 72 (b) OF UTAH- RULES OF· CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
Under this point, respondent argues that the judgSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment with whic4 this appe~l is conce:rn~d is interlocutory
in character, and therefore :requires compliance with the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding an appeal from
a judgment of this type. Lat~r, and in the conclusion of
his brief, respondent states, page 19, "No order having
ever been issued authorizing this appeal, respondent
moves that it be dismissed." This is, apparently, an
attempt to dismiss the appeal, an attempt which is without merit because: A. no motion is properly before the
court; B. such a motion may not be made at t4is late
date; and C. the judgment from which the appeal is taken
is a final judgment, and full compliance has been made
with all appellate procedural requirements. In the interests of clarity, these items will be argued in order.
A. NO MOTION TO DISMISS IS PROPERLY BEFORE
THE COURT.

The attempted motion is based upon technical
grounds, in that respondent claims there has been a failure to comply with Rule 72 (b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides that an appeal from an
interlocutory order may be made by petition to this
Court, which may grant the petition if the order complained of will invo~ve substantial rights and a determination of the correctness of the order will better serve the
interests of justice. Whether this rple is involved
depends upon whefhe:r or not the judgment is interlocutory or final. It sh9uld be emphasized that the atte·mpted
motion does not involve any question of jurisdiction.
In Attorney General of Utah v. p,pmeroy, 93 Utah
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426, 73 P. ( 2d) 1277, the decision discusses a 1notion to
disn1iss based upon the ground that judgment was interlocutory, at page 450:
~'*

* * This excerpt is given fro1n this old

\York on pleading to show that it was not jurisdictional with the revie'v court, but a policy of the
law which \Yas quite uniformly adhered to but not
inflexible. If the reasoning of the North Point
Case is correct and our jurisdiction depends on
the finality of judgments, a decision given by us
might be nugatory where it was afterward discovered that by inadvertence the judgment appealed from was not final although no one questioned it. If our right to pass upon assigned error
depends upon the finality of the judgment appealed from and such judgment was not final, any
decision or opinion we might make would be as if
it had not been made.
"In the light of these considerations, we think
the North Point Case was not based on the proper
grounds and we hold that section 9 of article 8
of the Constitution was a guaranty and not a
restriction on the right of the litigant to appeal.
Likewise, section 104-41-1, R. S. Utah 1933, was
intended not to prevent this court from ever
entertaining an app·eal from other than what is
technically a final judgment, but was meant to
assure the right at. all events from final judgments."
In this case, since jurisdiction is not involved, the
manner of attempted motion is of importance. The Utah
Rules of .Civil Procedure provide the manner in which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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any motion shall be made, in Rule 7 (b) (1) and (4),
which read as follows:
" (1) Motions. An application to the court
for an order shall be by motion which, unless
made during a hearing or trial, shall be made
in writing, shall state with particularity the
grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief
or order sought. The requirement of writing is
fulfilled if the motion is stated in a written notice
of the hearing of the motion."
" (4) Application of Rules to Motions, Orders
and Other Papers. The rules applicable to captions, signing, and other matters of form of pleadings apply to all motions, orders, and other papers
provided for by these rules."
It would seem perfectly obvious that where a party
merely states in the conclusion of his brief that "he
moves it be dismissed", there has been a complete failure to comply with the rules in any respect, and there is
therefore no motion before the Court which can be considered.
B. EVEN IF A MOTION TO DISMISS WERE FILED
IN PROPER FORM, IT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BECAUSE NOT PRESENTED WITHIN PROPER TIME.

The only attempt made to present" this motion is
found in respondent's brief, which is filed in answer to
the brief of appellants. The notice of appeal was filed
on March 9, 1951 (R. 38), almost seven months prior
to the time of the filing of respondent's brief. On May
23, 1951, a stipulation extending time for filing of briefs
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of both parties 'vas signed by them, and an order based
thereon entered in this Court on the same date. As late
as September 10, 1951, and at the request of the respondent, both parties stipulated for the correction of a minor
error in the record. It is of course obvious that appellants' brief had been filed literally n1onths prior to the
date set for argu1nent before this Court.
Respondent, if a motion to dismiss upon other than
jurisdictional grounds was contemplated, should have
filed the same at least prior to the preparation and filing
of the appellants' brief. Had this been done, the matter
could have been set for hearing in proper manner, and
ruling made thereon. While the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure do not seem to contain any provision relating
exclusively to the argument on a motion of dismissal on
appeal, Rule 75 (j) provides for a motion of the type
here involved prior even to the time the complete record
is settled and certified. In addition, Rule 7 (b) (3) provides for the manner in which a motion shall be presented to the c·ourt. In any event, the tenor of these
rules would indicate the desirability of disposing of such
a motion at a time prior to the filing of the appellants'
brief.
Certainly, this was clear under the provisions of the
Supreme Court Rules as amended, which were published
in the May-June 1947 issue of the Utah Bar Bulletin.
We refer particularly to Rule V, under which rule we
believe it clear that this attempted motion was not made
within proper time.
We are not advised as to whether or not this rule
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is still in effect. It is true that the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure have incorporated a few of the former Rules
of the Supreme Court. At the same time, however, it is
noted that the order of the Supreme Court adopting the
rules, which appears in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
at page VI, provides that all laws in conflict with those
rules shall be of no further force or effect after January
1, 1950. In addition, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provide, at pages 186 and 187, that certain portions of
Title 20, U.C.A., are superceded, and that all of Title
104 is revoked except the specifically detailed sections.
There is no mention of the Rules of the Supreme Court,
and so far as we can determine, no order has been
entered specifically annulling those previously in force.
If this be true, therefore, the-re would seem to be a
distinct possibility that these rules of 1947, as amended,
are still in force and effect, except as to any modification made in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
since there is no conflict between Rule V and the Rules
of Civil Procedure, this Rule may still be in effect.
Apart from these considerations, applicable law
would seem to indicate that this appeal is not made
within time. The decision in In Re Sheeler's Estate,
284 N.W. 799 (Iowa, 1939), states as follows at page
806:
"VII. Foft, as executor, and the Fidelity
& Deposit Company, in their brief and argument,
served November 17, 1938, in answer to the· brief
and argument of Champeny, for the first time
raised the question that the Champeny appeal
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should be dismissed. The causes for the 21st
judicial district were set for hearing for N ovember 23, 1938. If it be conceded to be a motion
to dismiss the appeal, it 'vas not timely served."
Again, in Griffith v. Walesby et al., 91 S.W. (2d)
232 (:Jio., 1936), the Court states at page 234:
"Aside from this, we do not think that the
point was timely raised. The cause was set for
hearing in this court on December 4, 1935. The
abstracts and briefs were required to be served
on the respondent 20 days prior to that time.
The motion to dismiss the appeal was filed on
November 23, 1935, which was after the abstract
and brief of appellants were printed and filed in
this court. The respondent could not have been
prejudiced by the failure of the affidavit to fol~
lo'v exactly the words of the statute and he
waited until after appellants had gone to the
expense of printing their brief and abstract before
raising the point. The motion to dismiss was
filed too late (Causey v. Wittig, 321 Mo. 358, 11
S.W. (2d) 11; State ex rel. v. Broaddus, 210 Mo.
1, 108 S.W. 544) and it is overruled.''
See also Cahow v. Hughes, 173 So. 471 (La., 1937).
C. THE JUDGMENT FROM WHICH THIS APPEAL
IS TAKEN IS A FINAL JUDGMENT.

It will be noted that this judgment (R. 30) is based
upon detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law
(R. 21), that it provides for the sale of all interest of
the parties in and to the real and personal property,
allows a liquidated amount to be available to respondent
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s
as cash in bidding, provides manner of notice, vacation
and delivery of_ the premises to the successful bidder,
and for deposit of proceeds with Clerk of the Court
for a later accounting.
It is submitted that this is a final juq.gment, in the
sense that the same is used from the standpoint of an
appeal.
A Utah case which is closely related from a factual
standpoint is Benson v. Rozzelle et al., 85 Utah 582,
39 P. (2d) 1113. There, this Court held that a judgment
as to certain defendants, or particular issues, or affecting special property, while all other equities as to other
defendants and claims were reserved for further consideration, may be a final determination for purposes of
appeal. The c·ourt considered a number of previous
Utah decisions, and in holding that the case involved a
final order, summarized applicable law as follows, at
page 590:
"This is a case in equity, and whether the
case be considered upon the appeal or upon the
application for a writ of review, this court is
called upon to examine the record. To attempt
to frame a general definition of what is or is not a
"final judgment" applicable to all cases possible
to arise in practice would present an undertaking not easily accomplished. Many definitions
have been attempted to define a "final judgment."
Most of them are criticized as being either too
specific or too broad in their terms. An interesting discussion of some of such attempts or
definitions is found in the case of Tucker v. Yell,
25 Ark. 420, at pages 429-432. This court in the
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case of K etchuu~ Coal Co. v. Pleasant Valley
Coal Co. et al., 50 Utah 395, 168 P. 86, 89, approved what was said in the Tucker v. Yell Case,
supra, and quoted and approved the statement:
·. .:\. final judgment is not necessarily the last one
in an action. ..A. judgment that is conclusive of
any question in a case is final as to that question,'
found in Sharon v. Sharon, 67 Cal. 196, 7 P. 456,
463, 635, 8 P. 709, and referred to the cases of
Bristol v. Brent, 35 Utah 213, 99 P. 1000, and
other cases as illustrative of the principle.
"~Iany cases present dual or multiple situations wherein it is necessary to enter judgment on
one or more 1natters that are final and appealable, whether or not other matters are treated
as interlocutory and are reserved for further
determination. An action for divorce, wherein
alimony, property adjustments, and counsel fees
are involved, presents such a situation. A mortgage foreclosure involving sale of prope-rty, or
the appointment of a receiver, and a possible
deficiency judgment, may involve similar principles.
"The instant case, fundamentally by allega- ,
tion but wanting in proof, charged the existence of a partnership and sufficient, if such existed, as to violation of partnership rights to warrant dissolution, and as ancillary relief prayed
for the dissolution of the partnership, the appointment of a receiver, an accounting, and general relief.
"While no money judgment has in the instant
case yet been entered, and while the appointment
of a receiver was denied, the procedure required
by an accounting certainly contemplates the examination and valuation of defendants', especially
Rozzelle's, property, and if the judgment of disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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solution of the alleged partnership is valid, the
court has the undoubted authority to enforce
the judgment of dissolution by attachment orother process to take into custody property, allegedly partnership assets, and punish as for contempt for a failure or refusal to so submit property, records, or information to the court.
"It would not be seriously argued that there
was no right of appeal in a mortgage foreclosure
until after final sale of the property, the making
of the sheriff's return under an order of sale,
and the entry of a deficiency judgment. A single
illustration will suffice. A brings a suit upon a
promissory note for $1,000 secured by a real
estate mortgage. B defends and pleads payment in full. The court finds payment of $500
and enters judgment for $500, interest, costs,
and attorney's fees, and orders foreclosure and
sale as provided by law. Must B wait until his
property is sold before he may appeal, or if a
receiver has been appointed has he no relief
from either situation if either alone creates a
situation from which irreparable damage may
result from the application of one remedy only~
"A final order dismissing an action which
puts one of a number of defendants out of court,
or directing the sale of certain property, or declaring certain property subject to liens or other
burdens, or directing a final disposition of funds
in court or in the hands of a receiver, may destroy some of the fundamental rights, some of the
most vital and important interests, yet there
may be other parties, other equities, and other
remedies to be considered, and the trial court
may have exercised its judgment on only one
of them."
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So far as can be determined, there are few Utah
cases involving similar facts to those presented in this
case. Ther~ are some from other jurisdictions, however,
factually similar and following the same general rules
as the Utah decisions. Childs v. Julian, 2 S.o. (2d) 453,
was a suit seeking the sale of realty for division among
joint owners, and for an accounting of the proceeds.
The decree settled the equities of the parties and referred certain matters of fact touching various interests
and liabilities of the joint owners to the register for
further report to the Court. This decree was held final
for purposes of appeal.
In Staley v. International Agricultural Corp., 194
So. 168, a decree which held that moneys co1lected by
an executor belonged to plaintiff, and that plaintiff had
a mortgage on the crops of decedent's tenants, was
deemed final for appeal purposes, even though the decree
ordered a subsequent account.
In Simmons v. Turner, 283 S·.W. 47, the decree was
held a final decree in a suit involving title to land, cancellation of instruments of title, and establishing the
ownership, even though the Court provided for a further
report of commissioners, who were appointed to partition land, as to rents, improvements, and taxes.
In this case, there was clearly a final order as it
decreed a s~le of the property in question, wiped out
the equities of the parties in the same, and as to this
phase of the action nothing more remained to be done.
Since a previous decree had established the existence
of a joint venture, there remained only an account, a
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matter which could easily ·be referred to a master, as
the rights of the parties had been fixed by judicial action.
c·ertainly, respondent can show no prejudice. Under
presently existing rules appellant had the right to
appeal in any event, whether interlocutory or final, and
the distinction, in a case of this kind, is essentially one
of mechanics.
On the other hand, if the judgment of the· lower
court is allowed to stand, appellant will be prejudicially
affected by a court ac~ion which could not later be
corrected. The order of sale as drawn, and as previously
pointed out, permitted substantial interests of appellants in the property to be destroyed. Once the sale
was consummated, respondent was free to resell the
premises. The account in all likelihood could not have
been completed prior to the expiration ·of the appeal
period following the judgment of sale. If, as we firmly
believe, the judgment was final, the appeal period could
expire before the account could be rendered, with the
result that a judgment without foundation in fact or
law, and highly prejudicial to the appellants, would
remain in force and effect.
In any event, the Utah c~ses clearly indicate that
the rule ~f . definition between interlocutory ~nd final
judgments is one which should not be permitted to impose
injustice ·or hardship. Thus, in ,Attorney General· of
Utah v. Pomeroy, s~pra, the Court stated at page 471:
"The principle that only final judgments are
·appealable rests upon a salutary policy of the
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law of ancient origin. Cases cannot be brought
up in parcels. But it being a policy of the law,
it is not inflexible and should not be invoked
w·here injustice or hardship would result. The
very struggle to get away from the inexorability
of the rule has led to various exceptions. Illinois,
which has adhered to the general rule, created
an exception where to deny the appeal would
amount to great hardship or a denial of justice.
See note, 80 A.L.R. 1192. Likewise, some of the
attempted distinctions between severable and
identical interests of defendants comes from a
desire to escape the inexorability of the rule."
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted that the respondent,
belatedly and in improper form, seeks to dismiss the
appeal upon grounds which are without foundation, the
judgment being final, and that to permit the dismissal
of the appeal would not only work a hardship on the
appellant but would be a matter of injustice which could
not thereafter be adequately remedied.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY
and WILLIAM T. THURMAN,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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